Iowa College, Williams, 4; Cornell University, University of Illinois, Johns Hopkins, Leland Stanford, Jr., Tufts, Wisconsin, 3; Bates, Colby, Cornell College, Kansas State, Knox, Minnesota, Northwestern, Vermont, Washington and Jefferson, Wesleyan (Conn.), 2; Antioch, Berlin, Central, Chicago, Depauw, Denison, Dickinson, Earlham, Emory, Fordham, Georgetown College, Georgetown University, Holy Cross, Illinois College, Indianapolis, Iowa University, Iowa Wesleyan, Leipzig, Mass. Inst. Technology, Miami, Middlebury, Mt. Allison, New Brunswick, College City of New York, Oxford, Pomona, Richmond, Trinity, Western Reserve, Wooster, 1. There are at present in the School nine Law School graduates, of whom seven have received also an academic degree, representing the following Law Schools: Cincinnati, Highland Park, Indiana, Iowa University, Kansas City, Kings College (Windsor), Washington and Lee (2).

A CORRECTION. — It has been brought to our attention that a review of "Trade Union Law and Cases," in 15 HARVARD LAW REVIEW at page 81, is susceptible of misinterpretation. We there said: "As the authors state, the book is not intended to be a legal treatise, but rather a working guide and manual for any one who has occasion to know and act on the present English law as to trade unions." Mr. Cohen, to whom the larger part of the volume is to be attributed, takes exception to our statement that "the book is not intended to be a legal treatise," and infers that we regarded the book as not intended for use by lawyers. Such was not our meaning. It was rather that the book was not a *treatise*, in the sense of being an exhaustive theoretical discussion, but was merely a working manual or compilation of cases for the use of "*any one* who has occasion to know and act on the English law as to trade unions," including lawyers as well as laymen. The correction of any misapprehension as to our estimate of the book is gladly made.

THE AMERICAN EXTENSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF DEDICATION. — Originally the rights which could be acquired by dedication at common law in England and America were limited to easements of way over roads and bridges. See *Baker* v. *Johnston*, 21 Mich. 319; *Post* v. *Pearsal*, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425. But in America the doctrine of dedication has been extended to parks and cemeteries. *Commonwealth* v. *Bowman*, 3 Pa. St. 202; *Redwood Cemetery Association* v. *Bandy*, 93 Ind. 246. This extension has had different lines of development. Cases where the parks were of an ornamental nature and so small as to be regarded as mere widenings of the roads, readily came to be regarded as within the rule. See *State* v. *Wilkinson*, 2 Vt. 480. But the broadening of the rule so as to include cemeteries and large parks appears to have arisen from a misconception of the case of *Pawlett* v. *Clark*, 9 Cranch (U. S. Sup. Ct.) 292. In that case land was conveyed for the purpose of establishing a church, but no existing grantee was named in the deed. The grant was given effect on an anomalous doctrine applying only to grants for the foundation of a church, according to which the fee may be in abeyance until the grantee comes into existence. The court went on to say, however, that the familiar case of the dedication of public streets and highways was similar to that which they were considering. In

Beatty v. *Kurtz*, 2 Pet. (U. S. Sup. Ct.) 566, and *Cincinnati* v. *White*, 6 Ibid. 431, the court placed its decision upon this *dictum*, which it regarded as the *ratio decidendi* of the earlier case. The rights in question related to burial grounds and to a park, and the decisions of the court accordingly extended dedication to such subject matter. The old doctrine in regard to grants for the establishment of a church, it is true, is in one respect analogous to dedication, in that the recipient of the beneficial rights is in both cases incapable of taking the legal title to the property; and that seems to be the sole force of the *dictum* in *Pawlett* v. *Clark*, *supra*.

The subject has been recently brought to notice by a Vermont case. The facts were in general similar to those in *Pawlett* v. *Clark*, *supra*, except that the purpose of the donation was to establish a cemetery instead of a church. Here it was decided that a charitable trust had been created. *Hunt* v. *Tolles*, 52 Atl. Rep. 1042. The decision is clearly correct, for here there was a writing sufficient to establish a trust within the Statute of Frauds; but the court, by citing as the chief authority *Beatty* v. *Kurtz*, *supra*, where there was no such writing, shows a failure to distinguish between a dedication and a charitable trust.

Even supposing that a writing had been lacking in the principal case, the court must have reached the same conclusion. For when the people have buried their dead with the acquiescence of the owner of the land, it would be a shocking decision which would recognize no public rights therein. A ground broad enough to support all such cases, including even those where there is no writing on which to base a charitable trust, is found in the principles of equitable estoppel. A few courts have said that dedication itself is but an application of these principles. See *Cincinnati* v. *White*, *supra*. But this view has been strongly opposed by some text-writers. See ANGELL, HIGHWAYS, § 156. And since the acts necessary to show the intent to accept the dedication would often not be such as to furnish ground for equitable estoppel, the criticism seems just. Dedication correctly understood is a method of transferring interests in realty, peculiar to itself because of the anomalous character of the recipient of the rights. See 14 HARV. L. REV. 65. Equitable estoppel is quite another matter. It arises when a man by his conduct has acquiesced in the actions of others until they have placed themselves in such a position that it would be unjust and unconscionable for him to exercise his full legal rights. This principle has already been clearly recognized and applied to the class of cases under discussion; *McClain* v. *School Directors*, *etc.*, 51 Pa. St. 196; and see *Shroder* v. *Wanzor*, 36 Hun (N. Y.) 423. It also underlies a similar class where a parol promise to convey realty within the Statute of Frauds is enforced because of a consequent change of position by the promisee in regard to the land. See 15 HARV. L. REV. 157. A careful discrimination between the principles governing grants for the establishment of churches, dedication, charitable trusts, and equitable estoppel, would lead to a more satisfactory condition of the law.

VESTED RIGHTS IN THE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. — The degree of protection afforded defenses to an action by the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that no state shall "deprive any person of property without due process of law," and by the similar provisions in the state constitutions, has not yet been fully determined. The theoretically correct